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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT UDOT'S ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A 
BRIGHT-LINE ABUTMENT REQUIREMENT. 
UDOT does not dispute that the facts in Ivers v. Utah Dep H ofTransp., 2007 UT 
19, 154 P.3d 802, and Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), 
are essentially identical to the facts of the present case. UDOT only claims that because 
Admiral's property abutted 500 West as opposed to 1-15 prior to the take it must be 
denied any claim for severance damages. 
In the Ivers and Miya cases, just as in the present case, condemned property was 
taken "in order to build a . . . frontage road parallel to, and connecting with, the newly 
widened and elevated highway . . . [and] the condemned land was used for the creation of 
the frontage road and improvement on Shepherd Lane." Ivers, 2007 UT 19, fflf 2-3. Also 
as in Ivers and Miya, upon UDOT's completion of the frontage road, the remainder 
property abuts the property taken and improved by UDOT. Finally, in all three cases, the 
property was taken by UDOT as part of a single, comprehensive highway reconstruction 
project. Here, title to the Admiral parcels was taken in the name of UDOT rather than 
Salt Lake City, and the construction of both the frontage road and the storm sewer were 
undertaken by UDOT without involvement of the City. Moreover, both of the parcels 
taken were an essential part of the 1-15 project. Without the relocated frontage road and 
the storm drain, the project could not have been completed "in the manner proposed" by 
UDOT. 
1 
UDOT's claim, that Admiral has no right to severance damages because its 
property abutted 500 West prior to the take is not supported by any of the cases it has 
cited nor by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-511(2)\ None of the cases cited 
by UDOT involved private property separated from the highway by an adjoining frontage 
road that was taken by UDOT and used as an essential part of a single, comprehensive 
highway reconstruction project. Contrary to UDOT's assertions, the Utah Supreme Court 
has not addressed this specific situation. This is an issue of first impression. 
In Miya, after the frontage road was completed by UDOT. Miya 's remainder 
property remained separated from the 25-foot high overpass by the width of the new 
frontage road. Yet. the Supreme Court held that just compensation damages must be paid 
for the diminished value of Miya's property. See Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. Likewise, in 
Ivers, this Court reached a similar holding even though the condemned property was used 
for the creation of the frontage road as opposed to the highway itself: 
With respect to lost view. se"\ erance damages are appropriate under Utah 
Code section 78-34-10 where a portion of property is condemned by the 
state and the condemnation of that land causes damage to the 
noncondemned portion of land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of 
land is "caused" bv the severance . . . when the vievs -impairing structure is 
built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is 
used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the 
project. 
Ivers. 2007 UT 19. ^  26 (emphasis added). 
UDOT seeks to distinguish Ivers and Mh a. and preclude application of Utah Code 
Ann. §"8B-6-511(2) to Admiral's property because it abutted 500 West prior to the take. 
1
 In 2008. the Utah State Legislature renumbered Utah Code Ann { "'S-S-^ -lO as § "83-6-511 
For ease of reference. Admiral will refer to the eurren: ^ ersion of the statute m its ?veo'*\ 3nef 
The express terms of that statute, however, make no exception for properties separated 
from the highway by an adjoining frontage road. See id. 
Moreover, the Court's recent decision in Ivers requires only that "the condemned 
land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the 
project." As noted above, the Admiral propeity was taken by UDOT as an essential part 
of the 1-15 reconstruction project. The Court should reject UDOT's attempt to impose a 
bright-line abutment rule under these circumstances. 
II. ADMIRAL IS ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE 
PROPERTY TAKEN BY UDOT. 
Amendment V of the United States Constitution and Article I. Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution prohibit the taking of private property without just compensation. The 
Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 in an effort to further define 
the specific elements of just compensation. The compensation to which an owner is 
entitled for "severance damage" to the remainder under subsection (2) of Section 511 is 
the difference in the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after 
the taking. See, e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952); Carpet Bam v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 772-73 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Such a determination can only be made by considering all of the 
relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value: 
In making the [severance damage] appraisal it is not only permissible, but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and 
willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into 
account in arriving at market value. 
J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, p. 316 (1995) (quoting State Road Com %n 
v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971)). The effect of the taking on fair market value, 
therefore, should be the focal point of the- assessment of severance damages to the 
remainder in the present case. 
This Court has clearly set the rules by which just compensation for such a taking 
should be determined: 
For compensation to be fair and just it must reflect fair value of the land to 
the landowner. Just compensation means the owners must be put in as 
good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their property 
not been taken. 
Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984). 
In an effort to avoid paying just compensation to Admiral, UDOT asked the trial 
court to segregate out certain elements of damages that obviously affect the fair market 
value of the Admiral remainder property. Such a position is directly contrary to this 
Court's decision in State Road Comm 'n v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971). In Rohan, 
the State Road Commission argued that it was improper to permit the defendants' expert 
to take into consideration and testify concerning diminution in value resulting from 
increased noise from the highway. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's position 
and held that the testimony of the expert who considered the increase in noise was 
properly allowed, notwithstanding the fact that it would have been improper to segregate 
and evaluate noise as a separate item of damage. The Rohan court held: 
there should not be anv attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of 
damage am loss of value due to noise or anv other such intangible factor: 
and this is true even where there has been an actual taking of property. An}7 
such attempt to so segregate and place a separate money value on the effect 
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the factor of noise would have upon property would inevitably involve the 
uncertainty and impracticability above referred to in this decision. This 
should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate 
item of damage, as was dealt with in the Williams case, nor for the purpose 
of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to 
the remaining property as plaintiff contends here. 
On the other hand, in order to correctly evaluate the severance damages, 
i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should be 
viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the 
improvement has been constructed. In making the appraisal it is not only 
permissible but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that 
a prudent and willing buver and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would 
take into account in arriving at its market value. The testimony of the 
defendant's expert which is here under attack indicates that he conformed 
to that formula. He properly and candidly included the facts that the new 
freeway adjacent to the property, with the attendant increase in traffic and 
noises, were among the factors considered in making his appraisal. But 
there was no attempt to segregate and place a separate money value 
thereon. We think the trial court was well advised in admitting his 
testimony and that no prejudicial error was committed. 
Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
UDOT criticized the Rohan decision in the trial court-referring to it as an 
"embarrassment to the Court." (R. 994 at 48-49.) Unfortunately for UDOT, Rohan has 
never been overturned and remains binding case law in the State of Utah. Now. UDOT 
has changed its tune and is attempting to distinguish Rohan from the present case. These 
efforts have likewise been unsuccessful. 
In an effort to distinguish the clear holding of Rohan. UDOT argues that unlike 
view and visibility in this case, which UDOT maintains are not compensable, the Rohan 
decision "cited to orior lavs of Utah as to when an increase of noise can be considered a 
J-
compensable damage claim/* UDOT's Brief at 16 (citing Rohan. 487 P.2d at 858 n.4). 
VvTiat UDOT ignores. ho\* ever, is the fact that the Court's ultimate decision in Rohan had 
"S 
nothing to do with whether some prior Utah decision allowed a recovery for noise under 
certain circumstances. Rather, the Court's decision in Rohan was based upon the 
fundamental rule that: 
"there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item 
of damage any loss of value due to noise or any other such intangible factor 
. . . . This should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of 
a separate item of damage. . . . nor for the purpose of fixing a separate 
amount to be deducted from the severance damage to the remaining 
property." 
Id. at 859.2 Accordingly, UDOT's efforts to undermine and distinguish this Court's prior 
decision in Rohan should be rejected. 
III. UDOT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED A WINDFALL AT ADMIRAL'S 
EXPENSE. 
As demonstrated in UDOT's Opening Brief, the decision to eliminate the value of 
view from the property from fail* market value provides a very significant windfall in the 
amount of that value to UDOT at Admiral's expense. See Admiral's Opening Brief at 
15-16. The harshness of the trial court's ruling is demonstrated by Admiral's purchase of 
the property for its appraised fair market value, which clearly included both the value of 
" It should also be noted that UDOT cites to Twenty--Second Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 103 P. 243 (Utah 1909). in support of its 
argument. However, the language of that decision quoted by UDOT actual!}' supports Admiral's 
position that the trial court must consider all factors that affect the fair market value of the 
property. See UDOT's Brief at 16-17 (citing Oregon Short Line. 103 P. 243 ("In that class of 
cases noises and similar interferences which ma}' affect the market value of the property not 
taken are ordinarih permitted to be shown, not as independent elements of damage, but as 
elements to be considered in connection with all other things which ma\ depreciate the market 
value of the propers interfered with but not taken.")) (emphasis added). That is exacth what 
Admiral did in this case. J err} Weber's expert appraisal report determined se^  erance damages to 
the remainder, based upon all of the factors that a prudent and willing buyer and seller, with 
knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at fair market value, including but not 
limned to. viev and visibilit} 
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view and visibility, only to have UDOT take the property without paying any 
compensation for view or visibility. This violates the constitutional mandate that 
property not be taken without payment of just compensation. See Utah Const. Art. L § 
22; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960) ("The standard of what 
is 'just compensation' in the ordinary case is the market value of the property taken, that 
is what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller."). 
UDOT failed to provide any meaningful response to this argument. Rather, it has 
tried to focus the Court's attention on technicalities, such as the supposed abutment rule. 
Nevertheless, the Court should not lose sight of the fact that the decision to eliminate the 
value of view from the property from fair market value is extremely unfair and 
inequitable to Admiral, and violates the constitutional mandate of just compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it was error to exclude evidence of Admiral's severance 
damages relating to loss of view from the remaining property. Therefore, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's December 27, 2007 Minute Entry and the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with the Court's ruling herein. 
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